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Abstract 
This article provides an analysis of the application of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 which provides for the making of confiscation orders following conviction in 
criminal cases. It examines the policy reasons behind the Act and traces the 
legislative development which commenced following the House of Lords ruling in R v 
Cuthbertson and Others that it had no jurisdiction to make an order for the 
defendants involved in, at the time, the biggest drug ring in the United Kingdom to 
forfeit their proceeds. This article considers the defendant’s ‘benefit’ from crime which 
may be assessed at a much higher amount than that which has passed through his 
hands. It focuses on three problem areas: cases involving joint defendants, the 
operation of statutory ‘assumptions’, and the discretion afforded to the court in 
confiscation proceedings. 
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Introduction 
 
On 3 September 1999, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced a project 
tasking the Cabinet Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) with enquiring 
into the recovery of the proceeds of crime: 
We want to ensure that crime doesn’t pay. Seizing criminal assets 
deprives criminals and criminal organisations of their financial lifeblood. 
The challenge for law enforcement will become even greater as new 
technologies hide the money trail more effectively. We must ensure that 
law enforcement is ready to meet the challenges.2 
                                            
1 Amy is photographed after receiving the Gard & Co. Solicitors Prize for the Best Law 
Graduate 2012 with David Wheeler, Dean of the Plymouth Business School, and Steven 
Hudson senior and managing partner of Gard & Co.. She is currently undertaking the the 
Legal Practice Course at Plymouth University and has secured a Training Contract at Bright 
Solicitors starting in September 2013. 
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Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2013) 1 
 
86 
 
 
As Ryder asserts, the PIU report, ‘Recovering the Proceeds of Crime’, was the driver 
of a reform process.3 However, Davies argues that the report lacked any 
criminological evidence to support its assertions and that despite reassurance by the 
Prime Minister, the legislative response to the report - the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 (hereafter POCA 2002) - ‘has undermined a whole series of traditional civil 
liberties’.4 The legislation is described as ‘draconian’ by both the judiciary and 
academic commentators yet has been consistently held to be a proportionate 
response to the policy concerns.5 This article is directed at the application of the 
legislation, specifically Part 2 which provides for confiscation following conviction. 
The tabloid press seeks to satisfy the public appetite for criminals to be deprived of 
their Rolls Royces,6 but also carries stories of hardworking fishermen labelled as 
‘criminals’ by the Act.7 This article examines how the latter, arguably 
‘disproportionate’ confiscation orders may arise and considers the approach of the 
courts in their application of the legislation.  
 
1 The Statutory Framework for the Recovery of the Proceeds of 
Crime 
 
1.1 ‘Operation Julie’ 
In R v Cuthbertson and Others,8 the ‘Operation Julie’ case, the three defendants 
were convicted of conspiracy to produce Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) and of 
conspiracy to supply the same, contrary to s.4 Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) 1971. 
Under s.27(1) the Court was permitted to ‘order anything shown to… relate to the 
offence, to be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with’. In the House of Lords, 
Lord Diplock began his judgment as follows: ‘My Lords, it is with considerable regret 
that I find myself compelled to allow these consolidated appeals’.9 Commenting on 
this, Alldridge stated, ‘it is [a] rare [way] indeed for a judgment to begin’.10 Their 
Lordships held that the proceeds of the offence were beyond the ambit of s.27(1) and 
                                            
3
 Ryder, N., Financial Crime in the 21
st
 Century: Law and Policy (2011, Edward Elgar), p.197. 
4
 Davies-Bosworth, R., ‘Money laundering – chapter three’ (2007) 10(1) Journal of   
  Money Laundering Control, p.56. 
5
 See Lawrence, I., ‘Draconian and manifestly unjust: how the confiscation regime  
  has  developed’ (2008) 76 Amicus Curiae, pp.22-24 and Young, D., et al., Abuse of  
  Process in Criminal Proceedings (3
rd
 Ed.) (2009, Tottel Publishing), Para. 11.12. 
6
 Thornhill, T., ‘Nice car, shame about the missing tax disc: £300,000 Rolls Royce towed 
away in Knightsbridge’, The Daily Mail , 11 November 2011. 
7
 Page, R., ‘To me Mick is a hero. But the EU says he's a criminal - because he won't dump 
dead fish in the sea’, The Daily Mail , 6 September 2008.  
8
 [1981] AC 470 
9
 Ibid., p.479  
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Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime, (2003, Hart), p.74. 
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that to extend the provision ‘would involve… a strained construction’.11  Lord Diplock 
stated clearly that ‘section 27 can never have been intended by Parliament to serve a 
means of stripping the drug traffickers of the total profits of their unlawful 
enterprises’.12 As Marshall observes there was justifiable ‘public outrage at the 
decision’.13 Cribb argues that ‘surely it was Parliament’s intention to strip offenders of 
the... profits of their crime’.14 Nevertheless, Cuthbertson was a turning point in the 
development of asset recovery law in the United Kingdom. 
 
1.2 The Legislative Response 
In 1980 the Hodgson Committee was established to review ‘the vacuum created by 
the law’ as highlighted in Cuthbertson.15 Its 1984 report, ‘The Profits of Crime and 
their Recovery’ recommended the imposition of a power, upon conviction, to order 
confiscation.16 The standpoint of the Committee was such that confiscation should 
‘restore the status quo before the offence’,17 and warned that confiscation following 
convictions for minor offences could in some cases be unjust.18 
The Drug Trafficking Offences Act (DTOA) 1986 ‘marked the beginning of the 
Government's campaign to deprive criminals of the fruits of their crime’.19 However its 
ambit was confined to confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking offences, and 
whilst ‘draconian’ its powers were considered ‘justified... by the serious and special 
nature of the crimes...concerned’.20 During the passage of the legislation, use of the 
provisions ‘as a benchmark... to justify a relativistic approach in the context of other 
offences’ was strongly opposed.21 
 
Following recognition by Parliament of the limitation of this early legislation in its 
ability to confiscate only proceeds of drug trafficking, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(hereafter CJA 1988) introduced confiscation in non-drug trafficking cases. The 
                                            
11
 R v Cuthbertson [1981], p.483. 
12
 Ibid., p.485. However ,although the appeals were allowed, the House of Lords refused to 
make an order for the return of the property in the UK which was seized from the defendants. 
13
 Marshall, P., ‘Risk and legal uncertainty under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’ (2004) 
25(12) Company Lawyer, p.354. 
14
 Cribb, N., ‘Tracing and confiscating the proceeds of crime,’ (2003) 11(2) Journal of 
Financial Crime, p.169. 
15
 Ibid., p.173. 
16
 Hodgson Committee, The Profits of Crime and their Recovery (1984, London Heinemann), 
pp.71 and 151 in Alldridge, Money Laundering Law (2003), p.76. 
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19
 Hancock, M., ‘Legislative comment – Money Laundering in England and Wales’ (1994) 2(3) 
Journal of Financial Crime, p.195. 
20
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‘robust’ powers in the drug trafficking legislation were the basis of the POCA 1995 
which further amended the CJA 1988.22 However it is clear that at this time a statutory 
distinction was drawn between confiscation in drug and non-drug trafficking cases. As 
Pieth observes, the legislative development resulted in ‘a patchwork of powers spread 
over a number of statutes’.23 Furthermore, in 1995 Levi and Osofsky identified that 
few ‘Mr Bigs’ had been convicted and were consequently unavailable to have their 
assets confiscated.24 The research illustrated the difficulties in confiscating proceeds 
of crime, attributing this to confiscation orders as ‘alien grafts upon the criminal justice 
system’ which prosecutors and the judiciary were reluctant to pursue.25  
 
1.3 The Proposals for Reform 
The conclusion in the Third Report of the Home Office Working Group on 
Confiscation that ‘the United Kingdom's criminal confiscation scheme... had not been 
as successful as originally anticipated’ provoked the overhaul of the legislation by the 
newly-elected Labour Government.26 The PIU report recognised legislative 
anomalies in the United Kingdom’s powers to recover the proceeds of crime and 
particularly the distinction between drugs and non-drugs crime.27 The report 
attributed this to the ‘focus on tackling drugs crime by governments’ and the rhetoric 
of the debates is such that the application of wider powers to drug trafficking offences 
was necessary to tackle this crime considered as serious and special in its nature.28 
The PIU concluded that the ‘pursuit and recovery of criminal assets in the UK is 
failing to deliver the intended attack on the proceeds of crime’.29  
 
2 Confiscation under Part 2 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
 
The POCA 2002 replaces the separate legislation for drug trafficking and non drug-
trafficking offences. Part 2 consolidates and updates the statutory provisions for the 
                                            
22
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24
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imposition of confiscation orders following conviction,30 and applies only to offences 
committed on or after 24 March 2003; however, decisions under the previous 
legislation form a body of relevant case law.31 Under s.6(1), the Crown Court must 
begin confiscation proceedings if two conditions are satisfied. First, under s.6(2) the 
defendant must have been convicted of an offence or offences in the Crown Court, or 
committed to the Crown Court for sentence or with a view to a confiscation order 
being considered.32 Second, under s.6(3) the prosecutor must ask the court to 
proceed, or the court must believe that it is appropriate for it to do so.  
 
Once the court has been asked to proceed, it must then decide whether the 
defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle’ under s.6(4)(a) which will depend on the nature of 
the offence of which he has been convicted. If the court finds the defendant has a 
‘criminal lifestyle’, it must decide whether he has benefited from ‘his general criminal 
conduct’ under s.6(4)(b) invoking the application of statutory assumptions. If it 
decides the defendant does not have a criminal lifestyle, it must decide whether he 
has benefited ‘from his particular criminal conduct’ – defined under s.6(4)(c) as the 
offence or offences of which he was convicted or which the court will take into 
consideration in deciding his sentence.33 Once it is established that the defendant 
has benefited from his criminal conduct, the judge must assess the amount of benefit 
termed the ‘recoverable amount’, and make a confiscation order in this amount.  
Where it is determined the defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle’, the court must apply 
statutory assumptions in assessing his benefit from ‘general criminal conduct’. The 
court must make a confiscation order for this ‘recoverable amount’ unless the 
defendant can prove that the ‘available amount’ is less.34 If he successfully proves 
this, the ‘recoverable amount’ will be the ‘available amount’. 
  
                                            
30
 The POCA 2002 also provides for the new mechanism of ‘civil recovery’; the ability to 
confiscate the proceeds of crime without a criminal conviction. However, analysis of this 
mechanism is beyond the scope of this article. 
31
 Ulph, J., ‘Confiscation orders, human rights and penal measures’ (2010) 126 (Apr) Law 
Quarterly Review, p.7. 
32
 s.70 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Committal is under s.97 Serious Organised Crime and 
Police Act 2005  
33
 Ibid., s.76(3) 
34
 Under s.9 POCA 2002 the ‘available amount’ is the total value of the defendant’s free 
property minus the total amount payable in pursuable obligations such as court fines, and the 
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2.1 The Assessment of the Defendant’s Benefit 
The House of Lords’ decision in R v May35 is considered the most important review of 
confiscation principles.36  
The judgment set out three questions the court must address before making a 
confiscation order: 
(1) Has the defendant (D) benefited from the relevant criminal conduct? 
(2) If so, what is the value of the benefit D has so obtained? 
(3) What sum is recoverable from D?37 
 
In ascertaining whether the defendant has ‘benefited’ from the relevant criminal 
conduct, s.76(4) POCA 2002 provides that a person benefits ‘if he obtains property 
as a result of or in connection with the conduct’. In assessing the value of this benefit 
s.76(7) provides that it is the value of the property obtained. In Jennings v Crown 
Prosecution Service,38 decided simultaneously with May, the House of Lords 
considered the interpretation of ‘obtains’ under s.71(4) CJA 1988; it thus follows that 
the decision applies to the 2002 Act.  
 
Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal held that ‘obtains’ should be interpreted as where the 
defendant's acts ‘contributed, to a non-trivial...extent, to the getting of the property.’39 
However, the House of Lords did not find this formulation ‘helpful or entirely 
accurate’, stating that ‘obtains’ must be read as meaning ‘obtained by him’.40 Thus 
Laws LJ’s interpretation was inaccurate as a person’s act may contribute significantly 
to the property being obtained without his obtaining it. Observing that ‘the rationale of 
the confiscation regime is that the defendant is deprived of what he has gained or its 
equivalent,’ the House of Lords took the view that it would be an unsatisfactory 
position where the defendant is deprived of property he has never obtained but 
merely made a trivial contribution towards obtaining.41 This would operate as a fine 
running contrary to the legislative objective: ‘to deprive the defendant of the product 
of his crime’.42 The House of Lords held that a person ‘obtains’ property if ‘he has 
obtained property so as to own it…alone or jointly, which will ordinarily connote a 
                                            
35
 [2008] UKHL 28 
36
 Rees, E., et al., Blackstone’s Guide to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (4
th
 Ed.) (2011, 
OUP), p.25. 
37
 R v May [2008], Paras. [8] and [48] per Lord Bingham,  affirming R v Johnson [1991] 2 QB 
249, pp.252–255 and R v Dickens [1990] 2 QB 102, pp.105–106. 
38
 [2008] UKHL 29 
39
 Jennings v Crown Prosecution Service [2005] EWCA Civ 746, Para. [38] per Laws LJ 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid., Para. [13] per Lord Bingham. 
42
 Ibid. 
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power of disposition or control.’43 This approach creates a higher threshold than that 
required by the Court of Appeal which had not required ‘control’. However, as 
Alldridge observes, ‘there is no necessary degree of permanence and no 
requirement for retention, in “obtaining”’.44 Nevertheless, the Court in May asserted 
that the object of the legislation is ‘to deprive defendants of the benefit… gained from 
relevant criminal conduct, whether or not they have retained such benefit’.45  
 
3 The ‘Proceeds’ of Crime 
 
The Court in May stated that the benefit gained is ‘the total value of the property or 
advantage obtained, not the defendant's net profit after deduction of expenses or 
amounts payable to co-conspirators’.46 Therefore, the regime confiscates the 
defendant’s proceeds not the profit from crime. As Gallant observes, ‘the 
distinction… is more than mere semantics’.47 Alldridge argues that a confiscation 
regime targeting profits is justified ensuring the defendant does not improve his 
economic position on the basis of crime. However, he raises the concern that by 
targeting proceeds, confiscation is used to ‘compensate for the fact that profits of all 
crimes cannot, practically, be seized’ and that this brings into question the 
defendant’s property rights. 48 
 
Confiscation beyond profits creates a punitive regime which Alldridge argues is 
unjustifiable.49 This approach is contrary to the recommendation by the Hodgson 
Committee that the objective should be to restore the status quo. However Ulph 
argues that by targeting profits the law would fail to act as a deterrent and 
subsequently meet its policy objectives.50 Furthermore, the 2002 Act consolidates 
previous legislation which did not focus on profits as illustrated in R v Smith (David 
Cadman).51 In Smith, Lord Rodger stated in obiter that, in the context of drug 
trafficking legislation, the courts had consistently held that payments received in 
connection with drug trafficking meant gross payments rather than the defendant’s 
net profit. His Lordship stated that, whilst draconian, it may be appropriate when 
                                            
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Alldridge, P., ‘The Limits of Confiscation’ (2011) 11 Criminal Law Review, p.836. 
45
 May [2008], Para. [48] per Lord Bingham. 
46
 Ibid., Paras. [8] and [48] per Lord Bingham 
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 Gallant, M., Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and Civil 
Remedies (2005, Edward Elgar), p.2. 
48
 Alldridge, ‘Limits’ (2011), p.834. 
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 Alldridge, Money Laundering Law (2003), p.134. 
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stripping criminals of their benefit from crime and that this ‘is a matter of judgment for 
the legislature’.52   
 
3.1 Proportionality 
The confiscation of proceeds of crime invokes Article 1 of the First Protocol of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which 
provides that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions’. However, deprivation of possessions is permitted in the public interest 
and the right does not ‘impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest to 
secure the payment of penalties’. Ulph has noted that a person might legitimately 
pursue on the basis of Article 1, should their property be confiscated.53 In Phillips v 
United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considered a 
confiscation order in the sum of £91,400 imposed following the applicant’s conviction 
for a drug trafficking offence.54 The sum was deemed a ‘possession’ invoking Article 
1 and the order to pay this amount coupled with a term of imprisonment in default of 
payment amounted to an interference with his peaceful enjoyment. The Court noted 
the qualification that permits ‘Contracting States to control the use of property to 
secure payment of penalties’. However, it stated that this must be construed in light 
of the necessary proportionality ‘between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised’.55 The Court emphasized the aim of the legislation; the use of 
confiscation in the fight against drug trafficking to deter, deprive the offender of 
profits, and remove proceeds from future drug trafficking operations.56 It was 
unanimously held that, owing to the importance of this aim, there was no 
disproportionate interference thus the confiscation order did not contravene Article 1. 
 
Shortly after the decision in Phillips, the House of Lords considered confiscation 
under the CJA 1988 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (hereafter DTA 1994) in R v 
Benjafield and R v Rezvi.57 The Court unanimously held that ‘the legislation was a 
precise, fair and proportionate response to the important need to protect the 
public’.58 The interference with the right to property guaranteed by Article 1 was 
justified as already decided by the ECtHR in Phillips. The question of whether the 
                                            
52
 Ibid., Para. [23]. 
53
 Ulph, ‘Confiscation Orders’ (2010), p.267. 
54
 App No. (41087/98), [2001] Crim LR 817. 
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confiscation regime is a proportionate response to the policy concerns cited by the 
PIU appears to have been closed by the decisions in Phillips and in Benjafield and 
Rezvi. However as Rees et al. note, the decisions ‘do not go so far as to accept that 
confiscation of property is proportionate in every situation’.59 Lawrence argues that it 
is the way in which the defendant’s benefit is assessed that operates to create a 
‘manifestly unjust’ confiscation regime.60 This article does not attempt a complete 
analysis of the regime but focuses on the three issues specified above. Thus, it 
provides an analysis of whether these features create an assessment of benefit 
disproportionate to the defendant’s actual involvement in the criminal activity. This 
concern is prevalent; on 22 February 2012, in a House of Commons debate on its 
use, several MPs alleged that the POCA 2002 is ‘the proverbial sledgehammer to 
crack a nut’.61 
 
4 Cases involving Joint Defendants 
 
The focus on the concept of ‘obtaining’ rather than ‘retention’ of property in 
assessing the defendant’s benefit ‘permits multiple recovery of the same sum from a 
succession of bailees’.62 The House of Lords in May considered whether this 
creates an ‘oppressive and disproportionate’ result and thus is contrary to Article 1. 
The appellant argued in favour of an ‘apportionment’ approach relying on the 
decision in R v Porter.63 The House of Lords in May cited with approval the 
judgment of Glidewell LJ in the Court of Appeal who had noted that in Porter the 
court ‘had not apparently been asked to apply its mind to the propriety of several 
orders... for the full joint benefit, nor was there analysis of why apportionment was 
more appropriate’.64 Lord Bingham stated that the sum which the appellant had 
obtained jointly with his co-defendants was considered, in law, as much his as if he 
had acted alone. It was held that the confiscation order, less than his realisable 
assets, did not create a disproportionate result. His Lordship asserted that ‘Porter 
was not authority that the court has power to apportion liability between parties 
jointly liable; this would be contrary to principle and unauthorised by statute’.65 It was 
held that a defendant with joint control will have ‘obtained’ property under s.76(4) 
                                            
59
 Rees, Blackstone’s (2011), p.15.  
60
 Lawrence, ‘Draconian and manifestly unjust’ (2008). 
61
 HC Deb, Vol.540, 22 February 2012, Col.309. 
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 R v Simpson (David) [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 111, p.117 per Dyson J. 
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POCA 2002 and that it is not unjust to treat it as his benefit even where this 
amounts to more than his individual profit. However it was noted that: 
 
There might be circumstances in which orders for the full amount 
against several defendants might be disproportionate and contrary to 
Article 1… in such cases an apportionment approach might be 
adopted.66 
 
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland applied this statement in R v Leslie & 
Mooney, holding that apportionment should be adopted where the confiscation order 
amounts to double the amount of goods stolen.67 The position has recently been 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Lambert.68 Pill LJ highlighted the importance 
of confiscation ‘as a weapon in the fight against… drug trafficking’. An 
apportionment approach was rejected; relying on the decision in May, the Court held 
that: 
It is legitimate that the entire realisable assets of a person who embarks 
on a joint drug dealing venture should be put at risk, up to the sum of the 
joint benefit obtained… not merely his assets… to the limit of his share... 
while the present statutory scheme is in place, the refusal to apportion is a 
legitimate part of it.69 
 
Pill LJ expressed doubt with regard to the approach in Mooney as the Court had 
merely relied on a summary by the House of Lords in May of the Court of Appeal 
decision. His Lordship identified that the House had not expressly stated its own view. 
 
It is arguable that the assessment of benefit under the POCA 2002 is disproportionate 
in relation to multiple defendants. The House of Lords in Jennings made it clear that 
confiscation should not operate as a fine, however in cases involving multiple 
defendants this appears to be the result of the application of the decision in May. 
Each defendant is subject to a confiscation order disproportionately large in 
comparison with the amount that may have actually passed through his hands. 
However the House of Lords in May added a judicial gloss to the concept of 
‘obtaining’: 
Mere couriers or custodians or other very minor contributors to an 
offence, rewarded by a specific fee and having no interest in the property 
or the proceeds of sale, are unlikely to be found to have obtained that 
property. It may be otherwise with money launderers.70 
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 [2008] NICA 28. 
68
 [2012] EWCA Crim 421. 
69
 Ibid., Para. [41]. 
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The first application of this ‘judicial gloss’ followed in R v Sivaraman.71 The Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the decision in May would determine the defendant’s 
benefit as the total proceeds rather than his profit. The Court held that the defendant’s 
benefit is a question of fact and thus it is critical to ascertain the capacity in which he 
acts. In Sivaraman, the appellant had been acting as a mere employee, not a joint 
purchaser who would gain a pecuniary advantage. The Court quashed a confiscation 
order for the total benefit, substituting it with an order reflecting the defendant’s 
benefit in fact. As Williams and Chegwidden observe, this ‘common sense’ 
interpretation represents an approach which seeks to reconcile the balance of 
interests.72 The decision provides an argument that the defendant is acting in a 
subordinate capacity thus restricting the potentially disproportionate scope of 
confiscation against joint defendants. However, Williams and Chegwidden identify a 
risk that the decision has ‘inadvertently created a ready-made defence by which 
criminal conspirators can avoid the thrust of the confiscation regime'.73 This would 
clearly defeat the policy objectives, as Ulph states ‘these accessories have been 
convicted of crimes…they are not innocent…[a] large number of crimes could not be 
carried out if there were not “smaller fish” ready to aid the ringleaders.’74 
 
5 Money Laundering 
 
In R v Allpress, the Court of Appeal considered the consolidated appeals of five 
defendants against confiscation orders in light of the decision in May.75 The defendant 
had pleaded guilty to ‘assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking’ under 
the DTA 1994.76 It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that the Court of Appeal in 
Sivaraman had erred in stating that it was necessary to consider the capacity in which 
a conspirator received property.77 This argument was rejected by Toulson LJ who 
affirmed the distinction between criminal liability and benefit, stating that ‘in 
confiscation proceedings the focus of the inquiry is on the benefit gained by the 
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 [2008] EWCA Crim 1736. 
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relevant defendant’.78 It was further submitted that the defendant holding cash ‘had a 
power of disposition or control over it… different from that of a bailee of tangible 
property’.79 However the Court of Appeal rejected this approach, affirming the 
distinction between custody and control of property: 
If [the defendant’s] only role in relation to property connected with his 
criminal conduct… was to act as a courier on behalf of another, such 
property does not amount to property obtained by him.80 
 
Therefore Allpress’ appeal and those of three other defendants acting as drug 
trafficking couriers were allowed; the confiscation orders reduced to the payment they 
had received. It was argued that this approach should be applied to the final appellant 
who had laundered the money. However, the Court took a different approach on the 
basis that the relevant bank account was in his name; ‘payment of money into the 
account gave rise to a thing in action in [his] favour… jointly with his partners’.81  
 
The Court applied the decision in R v Sharma,82 in which the Court of Appeal held 
that ‘a person who receives money into his bank account… where he is the sole 
signatory… obtains the money and has possession… for his own benefit’.83 The Court 
had also considered the question of proportionality, stating that: 
So long as… benefit... is correctly calculated, it cannot be 
disproportionate for him to be made accountable for what he obtained... 
the amount... is not affected by the amount... obtained by others to whom 
he transfers any part of the benefit.84 
 
The Court in Allpress identified that whilst the final appellant had occupied a role in 
which he assisted another, he had had ‘legal ownership and practical control’ of the 
proceeds of the criminal activity.85 The confiscation order was upheld on the basis 
that he had ‘obtained’ the value of the money received into the account controlled by 
him. Most pertinent is the affirmation of a common sense assessment of benefit in 
cases involving joint defendants as in Sivaraman. Alldridge states that a common 
sense approach ‘is to be welcomed’,86 and Millington supports this ‘more realistic’ 
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view.87 However, Allpress has also acted to provide limitation to the ‘common sense’ 
approach, as where money is laundered, ‘judges are more keen to confiscate to the 
full rigour of the law’. Alldridge argues that the justification for the distinction created 
between the defendant who receives a fee for his part in the criminal activity and 
where this money is paid into a bank account is unclear, stating that it is an irrational 
response ‘generated by… the glamour of the word “laundering”’. 88 
 
It is clear that application of Part 2 POCA 2002, following May, can result in a 
disproportionate assessment of the benefit obtained by defendants in joint cases. The 
legislation appears to create a fine, contrary to the recommendation of the Hodgson 
Committee and the courts have offered mitigation by taking a common sense view of 
the capacity in which the defendant has acted. Nevertheless, the moral panic 
surrounding money laundering has resulted in the disproportionate application of the 
legislation to those paying proceeds into a bank account. 
 
 
6 The Statutory Assumptions 
 
6.1 A ‘Criminal Lifestyle’  
Under s.6(4)(a) POCA 2002 the court must decide whether the defendant has a 
‘criminal lifestyle’. Section 75 stipulates those offences constituting a ‘criminal 
lifestyle’. First, those specified in Schedule 2 which include drug trafficking, money 
laundering, counterfeiting and intellectual property offences. Second, an offence 
which constitutes conduct forming part of a ‘course of criminal activity’, defined as 
where the defendant has been convicted of at least four offences in the same 
proceedings from each of which he has benefited or where the defendant has been 
convicted of two offences within six years of the start of the proceedings from each of 
which he has benefited.89 Third, an offence committed over a period of at least six 
months.90 
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As asserted by Briggs, the determination of a criminal lifestyle is a ‘highly 
controversial lynchpin of the Act’.91 If the court decides that the defendant does not 
have a criminal lifestyle, it must decide whether he has benefited ‘from his particular 
criminal conduct’.92 This will restrict the assessment of benefit to the offence of which 
he has been convicted and those offences taken into consideration in sentencing.93 
However, if the court finds that the defendant does have a criminal lifestyle, it must 
then decide whether he has benefited from ‘his general criminal conduct’.94 This will 
invoke the application of statutory assumptions which provide that the court must 
assume that any property transferred to or held by the defendant, or any expenditure 
incurred, in the six years prior to confiscation proceedings derived from ‘general 
criminal conduct’.95  
 
6.2 Application of Statutory Assumptions 
The serious offences listed in Schedule 2 arguably warrant the application of the 
assumptions; as Ulph argues, these types of criminal activity are ‘easily repeated, 
lucrative and with a low rate of detection’.96 However Schedule 2 also encompasses 
offences which may arise from a minor conviction, such as those who illegally copy a 
DVD and distribute to friends for a small sum.97 As Liberty notes, the statutory 
assumptions apply at a ‘lower and more trivial qualifying threshold of offending’ than 
under previous legislation.98 Furthermore, where a defendant has committed two 
offences in a six year period he will be considered as having a ‘criminal lifestyle’ 
regardless of the nature of these offences.99 As Ulph argues, a first-time offender 
involved in a dishonest scheme exposing him to a number of charges will be deemed 
to have a ‘criminal lifestyle’.100 
 
6.3 The Burden of Proof 
The Court of Appeal decision in R v Whittington illustrates the process and requisite 
burden of proof when applying the assumptions.101 Moses LJ stated that the court 
must first consider whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle. The court then has 
                                            
91
 Biggs, S., et al., The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (2002, Butterworths), p.80. 
92
 S.6(4)(c) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
93
 Ibid., s.76(3).  
94
 Ibid., s.6(4)(b). 
95
 Ibid., ss.10(1)-(6). 
96
 Ulph, ‘Confiscation Orders’ (2010), p.272. 
97
 HL Deb, Vol. 636, col. 1214, 25 June 2002. 
98
 Liberty, Proceeds of Crime (May 2001, Consultation on Draft Legislation), Para. [3.1]. 
99
 S.75(3) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
100
 Ulph, ‘Confiscation Orders’ (2010), p.272. 
101
 [2009] EWCA Crim 1641. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2013) 1 
 
99 
 
to determine whether the defendant had benefited from general criminal conduct, 
thus whether he had obtained property as a result of or in connection with his general 
criminal conduct. On the requisite burden of proof, the court stated that ‘it is for the 
prosecution to prove that the defendant has obtained the property in issue’.102 The 
prosecution is required to prove that the defendant has obtained the property on the 
balance of probabilities and may do so by proving that property has been transferred 
to him or that he has held it.103 Once the prosecution has established that the 
defendant has obtained the property, the question as to its source will then arise.104 
 
As Thomas observes, ‘the decision emphasizes that proof of [the existence of the 
property in issue] is the responsibility of the prosecution’.105 The purpose of the 
statutory assumptions is to assist in proving the source of the property once the 
prosecution has proven its existence. Once possession is proven, the court must 
assume that the source is his ‘general criminal conduct’. Section 10(6)(a) provides 
that the court must not make the relevant assumption if it is shown to be incorrect. 
The burden of proof is therefore placed upon the defendant to prove that the source 
was not criminal activity. In Whittington, it was held that the sentencing judge had 
misdirected himself as to the burden of proof in requiring the defendant to disprove 
the existence of the property rather than show that the assumption in relation to the 
property was incorrect.106  
  
6.4 Justification for the Reverse Burden of Proof 
As Alldridge argues, without shifting the burden upon the defendant, ‘there is little 
chance… the confiscation procedures will... yield sufficient money to make them 
worthwhile’.107 Furthermore, it is arguable that the defendant is best placed to know 
how he has acquired his assets and thus it is his responsibility to account for them.108 
However this can be contrasted with Liberty’s argument that it is not fair to place such 
a burden upon the defendant as ‘the system is predicated upon a model of rational 
economic behaviour, which cannot be safely assumed by society on a case-by-case 
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basis’.109 Liberty contrasts the United Kingdom system of confiscation with those of 
other jurisdictions, submitting that the absence of a threshold for application of 
statutory assumptions ‘has the capacity to lead to arbitrary and irrational results’.110 
However as Alldridge argues, ‘this sort of risk is one legislators are eager to bear’.111 
 
In Grayson v United Kingdom, the ECtHR considered the compatibility of the 
assumptions with the ECHR.112 The Court took the view that sufficient safeguards 
exist to protect the defendant’s rights observing that the assumption could be 
rebutted. Furthermore, the judge had discretion not to apply the assumptions if it 
would give rise to ‘a serious risk of injustice’.113 Applying Phillips, the Court rejected 
the argument that the requirement to pay money under a confiscation order  
constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions under Article 1, Protocol 1. As Ulph argues, ‘the effect 
of... Grayson is such that any legal challenge to the... assumptions would have little 
hope of success’.114 However it is clear the decisions in both Phillips and Grayson 
place great importance on safeguards provided to the defendant and yet their 
adequacy in successfully protecting the defendant from a disproportionate 
assessment of his benefit is questionable. As Lawrence argues, the defendant may 
not be in a position to rebut the burden... shifted upon him.115 Furthermore, as 
confiscation follows conviction, the court will have a preconceived view of the 
defendant thus affecting the weight given to his evidence.116 
 
6.5 A Serious Risk of Injustice? 
Under s.10(6)(b) POCA 2002 the court must not make a particular assumption if 
‘there would be a serious risk of injustice if [it] were made’. Lord Steyn in Benjafield 
relied on this safeguard in holding that the assumptions were proportionate.117 A 
‘serious risk of injustice’ was further defined by his Lordship as ‘any real as opposed 
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to fanciful risk of injustice’.118 However, as Rees argues, this safeguard is 
‘deceptively narrow’.119 In R v Jones, Latham LJ stated that it is only when 
considering the assumptions that s.10(6) will apply.120 The provision ensures ‘that 
[the] assumptions made… are not so unrealistic or unjust… moderating the ultimate 
calculation of benefit’.121 His Lordship stated that the concept of a ‘serious risk of 
injustice’ is not intended to moderate the potential hardship of a confiscation order 
but the operation of the assumptions in assessing benefit.122 This is illustrated by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Lunnon, in which the defendant appealed 
against a confiscation order imposed under the DTOA 1986.123 The sentencing judge 
had relied on the assumptions and held that there was nothing to displace those 
them. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that ‘if the judge had… made an 
assessment as required, he would have been bound to take into account… that [the] 
appellant had no previous involvement with drug trafficking’.124 Eady J stated that the 
‘serious risk of injustice’ provision under the DTA 1986,125 materially identical to 
s.10(6) POCA 2002, is of ‘fundamental importance’ as it is this that renders the 
reverse burden of proof compatible with the ECHR.126 As the Crown had accepted 
that the appellant had no prior involvement in drug trafficking the Court held there 
would be an injustice if the assumption was made. The court’s discretion not to apply 
the assumptions if it would lead to a ‘serious risk of injustice’ is therefore qualified. As 
Latham LJ stated in Jones:  
 
What is contemplated is some unjust contradiction in the process of 
assumption [such as] double counting of income and expenditure, or 
between an assumption and an agreed factual basis for sentence.127 
 
The court is not provided with discretion to determine that confiscation would 
unfairly impact upon the defendant but whether the assessment of benefit would 
produce an unjust figure. The introduction of assumptions to assist the prosecution 
in proving the source of the defendant’s property was justified during the passage of 
the DTOA 1986 on the basis of their applicability to crimes of a ‘serious and special 
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nature’.128 However the 2002 Act provides a much lower threshold than a conviction 
for the ‘appalling evil’ of drug trafficking the assumptions were originally intended to 
counter. Nevertheless, as Young et al. argue ‘the courts cannot be criticised for 
applying the law, even if that law is draconian – it is meant to be’.129 The provision of 
discretion to the courts does provide some mitigation of a potentially 
disproportionate assessment of benefit. However this does not go far enough, 
particularly where the defendant is a first time offender. 
 
7 Judicial Discretion 
 
Under s.6 POCA 2002 the Crown Court must proceed to make a confiscation order if 
the prosecution has asked the court to proceed. Thus no discretion is afforded to the 
court to refuse to do so. This is illustrated by R v Brack, in which the Court of Appeal 
considered the decision by the sentencing judge not to make a confiscation order.130 
The trial judge had dismissed the application, stating that the Act ‘should... be used 
for the “BMWs and yachts... of class A drug dealers”’.131 However the Court of 
Appeal held that the judge must comply with the statute and ‘it was not enough... 
simply to say that the prosecution should not have made the application’.132 During 
the passage of the legislation, the House of Lords expressed concern that the 
absence of judicial discretion may risk injustice by denying defendants a safeguard 
against the possibility of abuse of power by the prosecution.133 An amendment to 
provide the courts with discretion to refuse to make a confiscation order in 
exceptional circumstances was defeated when the Bill returned to the House of 
Commons. A mandatory procedure was determined necessary to strengthen the 
legislation against the increasing problem of organised crime.134 The Government 
argued that the prosecution is ‘under a duty to act reasonably and will not mount 
hearings for inappropriate cases’.135  
 
The legislation does provide some mitigation of the strict duty to confiscate by virtue 
of s.6(6), which provides that the duty becomes a power if the court: 
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Believes that any victim of the conduct has at any time started or intends 
to start proceedings against the defendant in respect of loss, injury or 
damage sustained in connection with the conduct.136 
 
However, the statute creates an anomaly; where the victim has not threatened civil 
proceedings and the defendant has repaid the victim or indicated an intention to do 
so, s.6(6) will not apply.137 In R v Morgan and Bygrave, the Court of Appeal 
considered conjoined appeals against confiscation orders imposed where the 
appellants had repaid or intended to repay the victims. Hughes LJ observed that ‘the 
decision to invoke... confiscation... [is] a critical one’ owing to its mandatory nature; it 
will not be appropriate to seek confiscation in every case.138 However, their Lordships 
observed that, whilst the making of a confiscation order is mandatory once the Crown 
requests it, ‘the court retains the jurisdiction to stay an application... where it amounts 
to an abuse of...process’.139 
 
Thus, while the court does not have an explicit discretion, it possesses discretion ‘as 
part of [its] inherent powers which may be exercised to prevent a truly oppressive 
decision’.140 Hughes LJ observed that this argument had been accepted in R v 
Mahmood and Shahin, but that abuse of process was not established.141 The nature 
of the oppression considered in Mahmood was an application for confiscation where 
‘the Crown had given some form of undertaking or agreement not to seek it if 
repayment were made’.142 The Court of Appeal affirmed that this is an appropriate 
situation in which to stay confiscation proceedings; however, their Lordships 
identified that abuse is not limited to an agreement reneged upon. In Morgan and 
Bygrave, the Court of Appeal recognised a further situation and held that it may 
amount to an abuse of process where: 
The defendant's crimes caused loss to an identifiable loser or… losers, 
the defendant's benefit was limited to those crimes, the loser does not 
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intend to bring civil proceedings… and the defendant has either repaid 
the full amount… or is ready, willing and able to do so.143  
 
Abuse of process may therefore operate as a safeguard where the defendant has 
voluntarily repaid the victim; however, as Thomas observes, ‘the scope for an 
application to stay as identified in [Morgan and Bygrave] is extremely narrow’.144 
Their Lordships expressly stated that the decision is limited to the particular category 
of cases outlined above and only ‘recognises that it may amount to an abuse of 
process’.145   
 
Contrary to the Government’s reassurance, the prosecution has sought confiscation 
in cases where it is unjust or oppressive to do so.146 In R v Shabir, the defendant, a 
pharmacist, had dishonestly inflated monthly prescription claims and been convicted 
on six counts of obtaining a money transfer by deception and therefore deemed as 
having a ‘criminal lifestyle’.147 The total amount of illicit proceeds obtained was £464 
however the total sums paid to the defendant amounted to £179,731.97. For the 
purpose of the legislation his benefit was considered to be the total amount and once 
the ‘criminal lifestyle’ assumptions were applied, an order was imposed for £212,464. 
 
In Shabir, Hughes LJ asserted that the courts should exercise caution in relying on 
the abuse of process doctrine and that its use should be confined to cases of true 
oppression.148 It was held that ‘the enormous disparity between the amount of the 
defendant’s gain and the order raised a real likelihood that the order was 
oppressive’.149 This alone did not establish oppression as the court expressed 
wariness of instances in which the assumptions may be legitimately applied. In 
Shabir the prosecution had relied on a charge of obtaining a money transfer by 
deception representing that the defendant had benefited by £179,000. Therefore the 
assumptions were brought into operation and it was this element that rendered the 
decision as oppressive; the Court quashed the confiscation order on the grounds of 
abuse of process.  
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Shabir appears to be the first time the courts have quashed a confiscation order on 
the ground of abuse of process. However, as Thomas asserts, ‘once the concept… 
has been accepted as relevant… it becomes… difficult to know when it is 
applicable’.150 Despite the widening of its applicability, the Court of Appeal has taken 
a cautious approach. In R v Baden Lowe, the Court reviewed both Morgan and 
Bygrave and Shabir.151 The judgment emphasized the ‘narrow scope for 
successful…applications in this context’.152 Thomas LJ sought to allay the concern 
raised by Thomas that it will be difficult to ascertain when the doctrine is applicable, 
asserting that ‘it is likely to be… very rare’.153 Their Lordships regarded the facts of 
Shabir as ‘unusual and exceptional’, affirming that it is not an abuse of process 
where the prosecution seeks to recover more than a defendant has profited from his 
crime.154 Ulph argues that ‘it would be inappropriate for courts to stay proceedings 
where the legislation is being applied properly’.155 Thomas supports this view, stating 
that the intention of Parliament would clearly be defeated if the jurisdiction were to be 
exercised more widely.156 
 
Five months after the judgment in Baden Lowe, the Court of Appeal in CPS v Nelson, 
Pathak, and R v Paulet,157 expressed concern that orders staying confiscation 
proceedings using abuse of process were ‘perhaps too readily being made’.158 Their 
Lordships reiterated the necessity of a restrictive approach considering that a ‘just’ 
result would be produced by proper application of the legislation.159 The case by case 
development of the applicability of the abuse of process jurisdiction arguably 
undermines the statutory provisions and thus the intention of Parliament. The Court 
of Appeal had expressed disquiet, stating that ‘it is not easy to conclude that it is an 
abuse of process for those responsible for enforcing legislation to see that it is indeed 
properly enforced’.160 However, the Court balanced this view with the recognition of 
the need to avoid ‘orders for confiscation… utterly disproportionate to the… criminal 
activity or… benefits from crime’.161 It was therefore strongly suggested that the 
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Director of Public Prosecution should issue guidance.162 Their Lordships adjourned 
the appeal by the appellant in Paulet, and at their suggestion the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) produced a document entitled ‘Guidance for Crown Prosecutors on 
the Discretion to Instigate Confiscation Proceedings’. As stated by Thomas, the 
guidance ‘appears to be aimed at securing some consistency in the use by 
prosecutors of the discretion given to them by the confiscation statutes’.163 However, 
this guidance does not appear to have been published widely beyond the CPS and 
therefore the consistency it is able to establish in the use of prosecutorial discretion is 
questionable. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Nelson was somewhat disparaging towards use of the 
guidance. Their Lordships stated that it would not ‘add, alter or amend the statute’.164 
The guidance is not formal guidance within s.2A POCA 2002, thus the prosecution is 
not compelled to pay it regard. It is therefore arguably of little effectiveness in 
ensuring a consistent approach and providing support to the doctrine as a safeguard 
against disproportionate orders sought by the prosecution. The recognition by the 
Court of Appeal that the guidance to prosecutors ‘may and no doubt will be amended 
in the light of experience [and] any later decisions in this Court’165 supports the view 
that the Courts are prepared to prevent truly oppressive decisions.166 However, the 
continued adamancy that ‘the jurisdiction must be exercised with considerable 
caution, indeed sparingly’167 means that ‘there is no risk that courts could use the 
power… to undercut the statutory scheme in a substantial way’.168 The use of the 
jurisdiction to stay confiscation proceedings is not on a parallel with judicial discretion 
and requires the defendant to surmount the high threshold of true oppression; thus, ‘it 
cannot be used to provide… some form of general protection’.169 Confiscation 
proceedings may be challenged, however this is unlikely to be solely on the basis of 
‘an enormous disparity’ between the amount that has actually passed through the 
defendant’s hands and the amount assessed as his benefit from crime. However, as 
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Esprit notes, ‘there may still be scope for challenge’ where this ‘enormous disparity’ is 
coupled with other factors.170 
 
Conclusion 
 
The question as to whether the assessment of benefit is a ‘sledgehammer to crack a 
nut’ may be easily answered in the negative by reference to decisions in the 
domestic courts and the ECtHR that confiscation is ‘a precise, fair and proportionate 
response to the important need to protect the public’. However, these decisions were 
an approval of the general compatibility of the confiscation regime under the law prior 
to the POCA 2002 and it is arguable that this does not determine as proportionate 
the very specific consideration of the literal application of Part 2 of the Act. The 
House of Lords ruling in May that each defendant in a conspiracy will have obtained 
property and thus benefited to the full amount of its value paves the way for 
confiscation orders to be made grossly disproportionate to the amount actually 
retained by each defendant. However, the judicial gloss added to the concept of 
‘obtaining’ which takes into account the defendant’s capacity in joint benefit cases 
offers a convincing mitigation of the disproportionate orders that may arise. However 
some academics question whether this is appropriate in its creation of a ‘ready-made 
defence’. It is submitted that this is an acceptable risk; the prime movers within a 
conspiracy are subject to orders for the full amount and thus the legislation operates 
according to its ‘reparative’ intention. Surely the recovery of an additional amount is 
gratuitous and the recovery of a sum more representative of a co-conspirator's actual 
benefit not objectionable?  
 
It is submitted that reliance on judicial mitigation of the disproportionate orders arising 
in cases involving joint defendants is insufficient owing to the inconsistency created. 
The House of Lords did not define precise instances in which an apportionment 
approach would be appropriate. It is submitted that apportionment is required to 
remedy the disproportionate orders arising in cases where the benefit is shown to be 
jointly obtained; however, the courts are clear that they are not prepared to adopt 
such an approach. The rationale is that it would be contrary to Parliament’s 
intentions; yet, the statute does not expressly prohibit the apportionment of benefit. 
The definition of ‘criminal lifestyle’ is drawn widely and is arguably disproportionate in 
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itself as the Act may be used against those whom it was not originally intended to 
target. More pertinent is the application of assumptions to such defendants. This 
power was introduced to permit the court to assume that property held by the 
defendant had been derived from criminal offences from which ‘peculiarly high profits’ 
could be gained. In cases far removed from these it is arguable that the application of 
assumptions creates a disproportionate assessment of benefit. Academics widely 
accept that the reverse burden of proof enhances the ability of the state to recover 
the proceeds of crime despite allowing an assessment of wealth that the defendant 
simply did not have. The risk of error involved and a potential to create miscarriages 
of justice is more concerning than the risk that the State may be prevented from 
confiscating large amounts of money from defendants. 
 
The decision in Phillips was that the assumptions under both the CJA 1988 and DTA 
1994 were compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. However, the 
defendant’s ability to rebut these is limited and it is an insufficient safeguard. Law 
states that the ‘serious risk of injustice’ test ‘appears to give the Court back the 
discretion seemingly taken away by the assumptions’.171 However this is 
questionable given the assertion by the Court of Appeal that the provision does not 
provide a ‘general discretion’. These ‘safeguarding’ provisions are limited and the 
specific reliance on them in holding that the legislation is proportionate arguably 
invites reconsideration. The absence of judicial discretion further enhances the 
potential for disproportionate orders. A mandatory confiscation regime was originally 
justified on the basis of the ‘appalling evil’ of drug trafficking and later to combat 
‘organised crime’. However confiscation has been sought in the case of a pharmacist 
inflating prescription claims. It is not submitted that this is inappropriate; the 
defendant had profited from crime and thus should be liable to confiscation. 
However, it is the mandatory nature of the regime coupled with other provisions, 
notably the assumptions, which amounts to an assessment of benefit, at times, 
grossly disproportionate to his criminal activity or actual benefit.  
 
The increasing recognition of abuse of process acts to mitigate such orders, however 
reliance on a reactive mechanism is insufficient. The prosecution as an partial party 
may continue to mount hearings in inappropriate cases to test the limits of the 
jurisdiction and are encouraged by targets set under the Criminal Justice System 
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Business Plan.172 The question as to whether the assessment of benefit under Part 2 
POCA 2002 is a ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’ may be answered with a resounding 
yes. The primary factors considered here contribute towards creating orders that are 
both disproportionate to the defendant’s criminal activity and the actual benefit that 
he has obtained from crime.  
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